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Constitutional Right to Compensation
for Injuries to Property in Opening
or Grading Roads in Pennsylvania
As is suggested by the title, we purpose to examine
merely the constitutional right to compensation for injuries
to property in opening or grading roads and will discuss
the statutory law giving such a right only as it is involved
incidentally in the constitutional question. We shall confine the article to the right to compensation for so-called
deconsequential injuries" so far as it is practicable to so limit
it. A dictum in a recent case ' said, "**** damages for consequential injuries cannot be recovered by a property owner
under the present Constitution, unless the legislature gave
that right and imposed such liability on the municipality;
****but unless the legislature, by statute, so provides, the
owner is without remedy". The general aim of this article
is to examine the Constitution and cases decided thereunder
to determine the justification for that statement and to
determine to what extent it may be regarded as the present
law.
Prior to our present Constitution, the courts of Pennsylvania held uniformly that there was no constitutional
right in a property owner to be compensated for land taken
from him in the construction of new roads or streets. If
improved land were so taken, the owner was entitled, at
least after 1700,2 to compensation for the improvements
'Westmoreland C. & C. Co. v. P. S. C., 294 Pa. 451 (1928); 144

Atl. 2407.

Act of Nov. 27, 1700; 2 Statutes at Large of Penn'a, Chapter
LV, p. 68, which read, "Sec. 2. Provided, That no such road shall be
carried through any man's improved lands but where there is a necessi-ty for the same; and where that appears, the respective courts
shall appoint six indifferent men to view and adjudge the value of so
much of such improved lands as shall be taken up for the use aforesaid, and the value thereof shall be paid to the owner of the said
land out of the respective county stock".
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taken but not for the soil itself.' It seems to have been
taken for granted that the right to such compensation was
a matter of legislative grace, there being nothing in the
Constitution at that time to require that such be given.' To
reach the conclusion that it was necessary to compensate
merely for the value of the improvements, required a
rather liberal emasculation of the words of the statute to
conform to a supposed intention of the legislature.
The reason given for the holding that there was no
necessity of compensating the owner for land taken for
public roads or streets was one peculiar to Pennsylvania.
It had been the original intention of William Penn to lay
out all the streets in the cities and towns and the great
roads and highways from town to town on lands owned by
Penn and not until that was done to grant lands to individuals, thereby obviating the taking of lands from private
owners for streets and roads. This was found practicable in
one great city (within the original limits of Philadelphia)
and accordingly was done. It was found impracticable,
however, to thus lay out the great roads and highways
from place to place and the streets in other towns, since
at that time no other cities or towns were planned definitely. Hence Penn abandoned this scheme of laying out
roads and streets only on land owned by himself. To make
it unnecessary to compensate private owners when land
was taken later for public roads and streets, each grantee
was compensated for such later taking at the time of the
original grant by the addition of six per cent to each
grant for which no payment was made by the grantee.
Consequently when land was taken later for roads and
streets no compensation was required, compensation already having been made. It mattered not that more than
six per cent of a man's land was taken for roads or streets,
Feree v. Meily et al., 3 Yeates 153 (1801); M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates 362, s. c. 6 Binney 509 (1802).

It will be noted that the

statute said "the value of so much of such improved lands", etc.
4See, however, Plank Road v. Thomas, 20 Pa. 91 (1852) where it is
said that the right to compensation for improvements destroyed is a
constitutional right.
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since it also might have been much less or none at all.
The cases are legion which make reference to this reason
for there being no constitutional right to compensation in
such cases. One of the best discussions of this peculiar
system is M'Clenachan v. Curwin.5 This historical reason is
doubtless the underlying thought prompting the dictum
quoted in the first paragraph of this article.
The constitutional provisions in regard to land taken
by eminent domain were held to be inapplicable to land
taken for roads and streets. The Constitution of 17766 said
nothing about compensation. "**** no part of a man's
property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public
uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives." The Constitution of 17907 read, "Nor shall any
man's property be taken or applied to public use without
the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being made." The amendment of 18388 said, "The
legislature shall not invest any corporate body or individual
with the privilege of taking private property for public use,
without requiring such corporation or individual to make
compensation to the owners of said property, or give adequate security therefor, before such property shall be
taken." This amendment was evidently aimed to insure
prepayment or presecuring of compensation where necessary and added no new right of compensation.
Under these constitutional provisions the Supreme
Court repeatedly held that where land was taken for roads
or streets, compensation was a matter of purely statutory
origin and not of constitutional right. When land was
so taken the State was exercising merely the express or implied reservation in every grant from the Commonwealth or
predecessors that as much land as might be necessary could
be taken for such purposes. This was true both where the
land was taken by the state itself or by a municipal corpor53 Yeates 362 (1802); also found in 6 Binney 509, opinion by
Shippen, C. J.
9Chapter 1, section 8.
7

Article IX, section 10.

8Article

VII, section 4.
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ation. A few of the cases applying or stating the general
rule are given in the footnote. 9
While this rule was and still is theoretically and constitutionally correct, where unchanged by constitutional
enactment, the practical injustice to subsequent grantees
from the original grantees, who purchase land ignoring
this reservation in favor of the State and who do not secure
compensation from their grantors, never became acute.
The legislature early granted a statutory right to compensation, not only for improvements, but for the land itself,
whether improved or unimproved. 10 This has been the
usual situation ever since and the constitutional right to
compensation for land actually and physically taken has
been in question but infrequently.
Several of the early cases seem to hold that the right
to compensation in such cases is a constitutional one.
Pittsburgh v. Scott" said, "Unless the Act provided a reasonable and adequate remedy for persons aggrieved, it is unconstitutional and void, it being contrary to the letter and
spirit of the constitution." Such expressions can be ignored
as being mere dicta, and as being opposed to the very
9Comm.

v. Fisher, 1 Penrose & Watts 462 (1840); Phila. &

Trenton R. Co., 6 Wharton 25 (1840); Yost's Report, 17 Pa. 524
(1851); Plank Road v. Thomas, 20 Pa. 91 (1852); Workman v. Mifflin,
30 Pa. 362 (1858); and Lycoming G. & W. Co. v. Moyer, 99 Pa.
615 (1882).
10Act of April 6, 1802, 17 Statutes at Large of Penn'a, Chapter
MMCCXCVIII, p. 151, section 14, p. 160, "And be it further enacted
by the authority aforesaid, That if a public road or highway shall be
carried through any land whereby the owner shall receive damage,
the person who sustains such damage, may within one year, but not
afterwards, make a representation, by petition, of the damage he has
sustained, to the court of quarter sessions, and the said court shall
appoint six disinterested men to view and adjudge the amount of the
damage (if any) sustained, and the said amount shall be paid, after
being approved by the court, by the treasurers of the respective
counties out of the county stock. Provided always, that it shall be
the duty of the viewers, in assessing damages, to take into consideration the advantages derived from such road passing through the land
of the complainant".
"1 Pa. 309 (1845). See also Sharrett's Road, 8 Pa. 89 (1848);

Keene v. Boro. of Bristol, 26 Pa. 46 (1856).
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great weight of authority, both earlier and later.
Since there was no constitutional right, prior to 1874, to
compensation for land taken for highways, roads and
streets, there certainly was no such right at that time to
compensation for land merely injured. This would be true
whether such injury accompanied an actual taking or
where no land was taken. If direct damages were a matter
of grace and not of right, surely the right to compensation
for indirect or consequential damages could rise no higher.
If the reservation in each grant included the taking of
land it must also include the indirect injury to land not
taken. The cases, without exception, held that the only
possible right to recover compensation for consequential
damages rested on .statutes and not on the constitution."
The court in these cases seems to imply that there is a constitutional right where land is taken but hold that the infliction of consequential injuries is not a taking within the
meaning of the constitution. The court also held invariably
that such injuries were not within the meaning of statutes
imposing the duty of paying for land taken. The injustice
and harshness of this ruling in the case of consequential injuries did become acute because the legislature had not and
did not provide any general statutory remedy for such
3
situations. The famous case of O'Connor v. Pittsburgh"
excellently illustrates the then existing conditions. There
the grade of a city street had been lowered considerably by
the city of Pittsburgh, leaving a church "high and dry".
The court could find no remedy-provided by statute; held
that such injury was not a taking within the constitutional
protection and in addition suggested that the immunity enjoyed by the sovereign and its agents from being sued without consent forbade recovery. The court suggested that a
12Green v. Boro. of Reading, 9 Watts 382 (1840) (change of
grade); Phila. & Trenton-R. Co., 6 Wharton 25 (1840); Monongahela
Nay. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101 (1843); Henry v. P. & A. B. Co.,
8 W. & S. 85 (1844) (change of grade); O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18
Pa. 187 (1851) (change of grade); and Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212

(1862).
2318

Pa. 187 (1851), opinion by Gibson, C. J.
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general statutory remedy should be provided by the legislature. This suggestion was not adopted, however.
At this time, then, there was no constitutional right to
compensation for land taken or injured in the construction or improvement of roads or streets against either the
state or municipal corporations.
With this situation in mind1 4 the constitutional convention inserted in the Constitution ratified in 1873, Article
XVI, Section 8. It reads, "Municipal and other corporations
and individuals invested with the privilege of taking private
property for public use shall make just compensation for
property taken, injured or destroyed by the construction or
enlargement of their works, highways or improvements,
which compensation shall be paid or secured before such
taking, injury or destruction ****."

It is applicable clearly

to municipal corporations taking, injuring or destroying
property in constructing or enlarging highways. The insertion of the word "highways" must have been intended
to change the ekisting law or the term is meaningless. But
it is by its terms applicable only to such municipal corporations as are "invested with the privilege of taking private
property for public use." If it be not invested with such
privilege, no compensation need be paid by it for in such a
case either the taking or injuring is by virtue of some
superior authority which must be regarded as doing the
taking or injuring or else the taking or injuring is a wrongful one for which the ordinary remedies of the law would
be available. It is also clear that the provision was not intended to make any change in the rights of owners of private property as against the State. The Convention and
People are presumed to have known the existing law that
there was no constitutional right as against the State; to
have known that the general provision inserted in Article I,
14See explicit statements to that effect in Pa. R. Co. v. Lippincott, 116 Pa. 472 (1887); Pa. R. Co. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541 (1888);
Pa. R. Co. v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75 (1889); O'Brien v. Phila., 150 Pa.
589 (1892); Mellor v. Phila., 160 Pa. 614 (1894); Ladd v. Phila,, 17i
Pa. 485 (1895) and Stork v. Phila., 195 Pa. 101 (1900).
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Section 1015 was but a repetition of the meaning of the provision in the Constitution of 179016 with some slight change
in wording; that this earlier provision created no right
against the State in road cases; and in leaving out the State
from Article XVI, Section 8, must have intended to permit
the law to remain as it was.
The cases decided in the several decades next succeeding the adoption of the new Constitution were unanimous
in holding that this provision in the Constitution was intended to and did create in property owners a constitutional
right to compensation against municipal corporations not
only for property taken in constructing or improving roads
and streets but also for property injured or destroyed.
While it was admitted that the legislature might regulate
this right, it never was suggested that the right was dependent upon legislative action for its existence. In fact,
prior to any legislative remedy for enforcement of the
right, the courts permitted enforcement by actions of trespass on the case. In view of some recent statements by
the courts, we shall examine some of these cases more in
detail.
In City of Reading v. Althouse1 7 the court said, "That
section provides for the making of compensation, not only
for the taking of private property for public use, as was the
case theretofore, but also for its injury or destruction.
Previous cases, that an action for consequential damages
against a corporation possessed of the right of eminent
domain, cannot be sustained, are now of no value, for the
new constitution has introduced a different rule."
Boro. of New Brighton v. U. P. Church involved the
change of grade of a street by a borough. It was held,
"This section (Const. Art. XVI, sec. 8) thus gives compensation for property injured in the construction and en15"nor shall private property be taken or applied to public use
without authority of law, and without just compensation being first
made or secured".
1
6Article IX, section 10.
1793 Pa. 400 (1880).
1L96 Pa. 331 (1880).
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largement of highways. The Act of 1878, P. L. 129 gives
effect to the Constitution and defines the liabilities of boroughs".
In speaking of this constitutional provision the court
in Pusey v. City of Allegheny"9 said, "This is an advance upon
the limitations of the right of eminent domain, as found in
the bill of rights both of the present constitution and that
of 1838. It makes municipal corporations liable for what
are ordinarily called consequential damages. This being
now the supreme law of the land, it must govern and it is
idle to recur to decisions and legislation, the authority of
which, as to all present and future cases, is, by this provision, annulled. * * * * The constitution in positive terms
requires compensation to be made, not only for private
property that a corporation may appropriate to its own
use, but also for such as it may injure or destroy".
County of Chester v. Brower 0 held that where the abutments or approaches to a county bridge interfered with
access to houses, that even though there was no taking
of property, there was an injury to property and since no
legislative remedy for the constitutional right had been
provided, an action on the case would lie against the
county which built the bridge.
In Appeal of the County of Delaware2 1 it was said, "The
right to compensation for what are usually called consequential injuries, that is to say, where property is injured
without being actually taken, is given by section 8 of Article
XVI of the Constitution. * * * * We have therefore held
that inasmuch as the legislature has provided no remedy
for the assessment of such damages, an action on the case
will lie to enforce the right conferred by the constitution.
* * * * The only difference between the late constitution
and the present one is, that in the former, compensation
was given only for property taken; in the latter, compensation is given for property taken, injured or destroyed".
1998 Pa. 522 (1881).
20117
21119

Pa. 647 (1888).
Pa. 159 (1888).
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Schuler v. Phila.22 said that this provision made the right
for consequential damages, which in Philadelphia had been
statutory under the Act of 1854, P. L. 37, into a constitutional right.
One of the strongest cases affirming the constitutional right is Parkesburg Borough Streets. 3 It was there
said, "But if there was ever any doubt as to the liability
of municipal corporations in such cases (laying out of
streets by borough authorities), the 8th section of the 16th
article of the constitution must certainly settle the question.
This section provides: 'Municipal and other corporations, and
individuals invested with the privilege of taking private
property for public use, shall make just compensation for
property taken, injured or destroyed by the construction
or enlargement of their works, highways or improVements,
which compensation shall be paid or secured before such
taking, injury or destruction'. If this does not impose payment of the damages for property taken, in the construction of highways, upon the municipality taking it, it would
be difficult to suggest language which would be adequate
for that purpose". The court was speaking of taking land
but taking and injuring are indistinguishable under this
provision. The court was careful to distinguish those cases
where roads are opened through or into a borough by the
action of the Court of Quarter Sessions and says that there
the land is taken not by the municipality but by the State
and that there would be no liability on the municipality.
In Snyder v. City of Lancaster2' a street was opened by
the city. It took most of the adjoining house but none of
that of the plaintiff. It was claimed, in seeking damages,
that the taking of the adjoining house would injure that of
the plaintiff by requiring rebuilding of the outside wall. The
Supreme Court said, "It is testified that the plaintiff's house
will have no gable end when the Worth house is taken
down. If such is the case the plaintiff's house will certainly
be injured by the removal of the Worth house, and as this
W. N. C. 161 (1888)-a Supreme Court case.
23124 Pa. 511 (1889).
2120 W. N. C. 184 (1891)-a Supreme Court case.
2222
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removal is a necessary part of the opening of Filbert Street,
we cannot avoid the conclusion that the opening of the
street is, or will be, the direct cause of the injury to the
plaintiff's house. This being so, the case comes within
the operation of section 8, Article XVI, of the Constitution
of 1874 * * * *"
In Jones v. Boro. of Bangor2 5 it was held that a prior
dedication of the street did not preclude a securing of damages for a later change of grade by the borough.
The court held, in O'Brien v. Phila.,- where damages
were sought for change of grade of a street by the city,
"If any regard is to be had for the constitutional mandate
that 'municipal and other corporations * * * * shall make

just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed
by the construction or enlargement of their works, highways or improvements', we are at a loss to see how the
learned judge could do otherwise than decide the reserved
question as he did (permitting recovery). Nobody conversant with the history of the constitutional provision
above quoted can entertain any doubt that it was intended
to provide, inter alia, for that class of cases of which
O'Connorv. Pittsburgh,18 Pa. 187, is a conspicuous example.
It has uniformly been so regarded from the date of its adoption to the present time. * * * * To hold that it was

damnum absque injuria would defeat one of the objects of
the constitutional mandate in question and virtually overrule several well considered cases". The plaintiff recovered
damages.
Another important case is Mellor v. Phila.2 7

Here a

grade crossing was abolished by order of the city council
and the grade of the street lowered to such an extent that
it practically prevented all ingress and egress by vehicles
to the properties in question from this changed street.
These properties did not abut on the lowered street but on
one that entered the lowered street at a right angle to the
latter. The plaintiff sought damages and the defendant
2,144 Pa. 638 (1892).
26150 Pa. 589 (1892).
2
1160 Pa. 614 (1894).
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claimed that the constitutional provision was inapplicable
because the properties did not abut on the streets the grade
of which had been changed. The court said, "This (defendant's contention) would indeed be a very narrow and
unreasonable construction of the words of the constitution,
especially in view of the history and object of the constitutional provision. It was intended to provide against the
great injustice that was continually resulting from the
ruling of the court in O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187,
that 'the constitutional provision for the case of private
property taken for public use extends not to the case of
property injured or destroyed'. In doing this the people of
the Commonwealth recognized, in a practical way, the
justice of compensating private property owners, not only
for property taken, but also for property injured or 'destroyed by municipal and other corporations and individuals, of
the specified class, by the construction and enlargement of
their works, highways or improvements". The court held
that there was nothing to limit the right to property fronting or abutting on the particular work, highway or improvement. The injury must be proximate and immediate
and substantial. Damages were allowed. No statute was
mentioned in the case but the right of recovery was based
entirely on the constitution.
In Stork v. Phila.2 s it was held that the injury meant
to be provided for under this provision was such a one as
was unavoidable in the accomplishment of the object of the
work. "For such injury there was no redress under the
former constitution and it was to remedy this defect that
the present constitution added property 'injured or destroyed' to property 'taken' compensation for which had always
been secured".
Lafean v. York County"'9 involved the erection of a
county bridge which interfered with the access and light
and air of an abutting owner from whom no property was
taken. The court said, "Prior to the adoption of the Con24195

Pa. 101 (1900).

2920 Pa. Super. Ct. 573 (1902),
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stitution of 1874, a person injured in the manner complained
of by the plaintiff was without remedy. But section 8,
Article XVI of that instrument gave the right to recover
damages for such an injury, and until the legislature provided a remedy for the enforcement of the right, a person
thus injured was entitled to maintain a common law action,
which prior to the Procedure Act of 1887, would have been
an action on the case and since that act was an action of
trespass. This was decided in Chester County v. Brower,
117 Pa. 647, a case which, so far as the nature of the injury
is concerned, is parallel with the present case in every essential particular". Recovery was permitted.
0 said, "The constitution gave the
Cooper v. Scranton"
plaintiff a right to compensation; the remedy has been
regulated by statutes".
Numerous other cases which either concede that there
is a constitutional right to damages for consequential injuries or in which such is a necessary implication, are cited
in the footnote.3 1
$121 Pa. Super. Ct. 17 (1902).
3
"Boro. of N. Brighton v. Piersol, 107 Pa. 280 (1884); P. J. R. Co.
v. McCutcheon, 18 W. N. C. 527 (1886); Pa. R. Co. v. Duncan, 111
Pa. 352 (1886); P. & R. Co. v. Patent, 17 W. N. C. 198 (1886); Pa.
R. Co. v. Lippincott, 116 Pa. 472 (1887); N. C. Ry. Co. v. Holland, 117
Pa. 613 (1888); Pa. R. Co. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541 (1888); Pa. R.
Co. v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75 (1889); Pa. R. Co. v. Walsh, 124 Pa. 544
(1889); Pa. R. Co. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa. 560 (1889); Chambers v. S.
Chester Boro., 140 Pa. 510 (1891); Bear v. Allentown, 148 Pa. 80
(1892); Fredericks v. Canal Co., 148 Pa. 317 (1892); Groff v. Phila.,
150 Pa. 594 (1892); Hobson v. Phila., 150 Pa. 595 (1892); Tucker
Street, 166 Pa. 336 (1895); Ladd v. Phila., 171 Pa. 485 (1895); Walnut
St. Bridge, 191 Pa. 153 (1899); Chatham Street, 191 Pa. 604 (1899);
Fyfe v. Turtle Creek Boro., 22 Pa. Super. Ct. 292 (1903); Sedgley
Ave., 217 Pa. 313 (1907); Robbins v. Scranton, 217 Pa. 577 (1907);
Ogontz Ave., 225 Pa. 126 (1909)-pointing out difference in holdings
in railroad cases; Spring Brook W. S. Co. v. Pa. C. Co., 54 Pa. Super.
Ct. 380 (1913); Nichols v. Wellsboro, 57 Pa. Super. Ct. 306 (1914);
Iron City Auto Co. v. Pittsburgh, 253 Pa. 478 (1916); Jackman v.
Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158 (1919); Shobert v. Bloomsburg, 74 Pa.
Super. Ct. 246 (1920); Spang & Co. v. Comm., 281 Pa. 414 (1924);
Phila. v. Comm., 284 Pa. 225 (1925); and Oakdale Boro. v. Allegheny
County, 91 Pa. Super. Ct. 100 (1927).
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There are cases deciding that no constitutional right
exists to such compensation as against some municipal corporations either because they are not "invested with the
privilege of taking private property for public use" or that
in the particular case, though so invested, the State was responsible for the taking or injury and not the municipal
corporation. The.constitutional provision necessarily implies that the right to compensation exists only where the
municipal corporation does the taking or injuring and where
the acts are done by the State with the municipality being
a mere paymaster of all or part of the cost, no such right
exists. There being no constitutional liability in the State
there can be none in the paymaster unless such liability is
imposed on the latter by legislative enactment. But the
implied argument in a later case that since no municipal
corporation can exist or act in anything without prior legislative action, every taking or injuring is therefore by the
State carries this logical deduction to an illogical absurdity,
completely ignoring the intent and wording of the consitutional provision in question.
In Twp. of East Union v. Conirey3 2 a road was opened
under a special act of Assembly with the costs imposed on
the townships affected thereby. The court rightfully held
that the taking was by the State and that compensation
was a matter of grace and not of constitutional right.
It was decided in Lamoreux v. Luzerne County33 "It is
true a county is recognized as a municipal corporation under
the Constitution of 1874 and subsequent legislation, and in
some cases it may take private property for public use. This
road, however, was not taken by the county. The proceedings for taking the land for this road, were not instituted
by the county nor under its authority. The county has no
ownership in the road, nor control over it. It is a public
road or highway of the Commonwealth, which the township in which it is located is bound to keep in repair. The
township and not the county is liable for damages caused by
3100 Pa. 362 (1882).
33116 Pa. 195 (1887).
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a neglect to keep it in proper repair. It follows in this
case, the facts do not come within any act authorizing the
plaintiff to appeal". The case is a direct admission that
where a road is opened by the Court of Quarter Sessions
in townships, the fact that the county pays for the land
taken does not bring it within' the constitutional provision.
Wagner v. Salzburg Twp.3

4

involved a change of grade

made by township supervisors in laying out a public road.
The court held that the constitutional provision was inapplicable. The court said, "But we do not think a township
is such a corporation invested with the power of taking
private property for public use as is within the purview of
this constitutional provision. The township does not take
land for a highway. It does not lay out the road. The law
imposes on it the duty of opening the road, and keeping
it in repair, for the benefit of the travelling public; but the
duties of the township do not begin until the road has been
laid out by proceedings in the Court of Quarter Sessions.
The right to sue cannot be rested, therefore, on the Constitution". The court is giving two reasons for the absence
of a constitutional right: (1) the township is not a corporation invested with the privilege of taking land for public
use; (2) even though it were such, here the act of taking
and injuring is that of the State and not of the township.
In such a case the right to compensation is purely statutory
and there being no statute giving the right, no recovery
could be had. The decision is correct, but is not authority
for the statement that the right to consequential damages
against all municipal corporations is purely statutory.
In Shoe v. Nether Providence Twp.,f a case involving
damages resulting from a change of grade made by the
township supervisors, it was decided that the township was
not within the meaning of the constitutional provision and
that townships are liable only to the same extent that they
were before the constitution, unless some statute extends
their liability. The case is a mere iteration of the Wagner
case and adds nothing to it.
26132 Pa. 636 (1890).
053 Pa. Super. Ct. 137 (1896).
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Howell v. Morrisville" after discussing the previous
cases, held, "It must therefore be accepted as settled law,
that the vacation of a highway or street is not an injury to
the abutting landowners within the provisions of the Constitution requiring compensation, and in the absence of
special legislative provision for damages none can be recovered". The case holds that there is no injury in the constitutional sense, which is of questionable soundness, but in
no manner decides that where there is such an injury, the
right to compensation is of statutory origin merely. 7
Snively v. Washington Twp.8 8 has been quoted for the
rule that consequential damages are purely of statutory
grant and not of constitutional right. The case, however,
deals solely with acts of township supervisors and decides
that townships are not liable, under the constitution, for
consequential damages in road cases. The case does not
mention the present Constitution and is certainly no authority for a general rule that the present Constitution
gives no right to compensation for consequential injuries
against proper municipal corporations.
The first of the recent cases involving consequential injuries by change of grade was Jarnison v. Cumberland
County. 9 The change of grade was made by the State
Highway Department in a township road and the county
was required to pay the damages assessed but the statute
gave no right to compensation for injuries where no land
was actually taken in making the improvement. The grade
was raised to such an extent as to do substantial injury to
the abutting owner who brought an action of trespass to
recover therefor against the county. Recovery was denied,
the court deciding that the constitutional provision was inapplicable under the existing facts. It was said, "Any
taking of, or injury to, property authorized by the Acts of
1905 and 1907, involves an exercise of the right of eminent
36212 Pa. 349 (1905).
87See also Saeger v. Comm., 258 Pa. 239 (1917) for the same result
where the vacation is by the Commonwealth.
88218 Pa. 249 (1907).
"948 Pa. Super. Ct. 32 (1911); s. c. 234 Pa. 621 (1912).
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domain by the state in its sovereign capacity, acting
through one of its executi, e departments. The statute conferred upon counties no privilege to take private property
in connection with the improvement of a township road,
nor did it give a county any control over or right in such
road before, during or after the completion of the improvement. * * * * The statute, as amended, does allow com-

pensation for property actually taken in improving a road
under its provisions, by the state highway department, but
that, as is shown by the authorities above cited, was a
matter of grace and not of constitutional right. The fact
that the statute made the county the paymaster, in the
first instance, for property thus taken, did not make the
county a corporation 'invested with the privilege of taking
property for public use' within the meaning and spirit of
the constitutional provision, nor did it vest parties whose
property was not actually taken with the constitutional
right to demand consequential damages for injuries alleged
to have resulted from change of grade. * * * * The County

of Cumberland was not invested with the right to take
private property for public use in making the improvement
in question; the road was not and did not become a work,
highway or improvement of the county or over which the
county had control, and the constitutional provision in question has no application". The case, by dictum, says that the
constitutional provision does apply in the case of the erection of county bridges. The Supreme Court, on appeal to
it, said in addition to other things, "The State directly, not
the County or township exercises the power of eminent
domain, and injuries suffered by property owners are attributable to the State and not to the County". The case
therefore decides that where the acts causing the injury are
undertaken by the State Highway Department, the county
is not causing the injury and there is no constitutional right
to compensation under the provision in re municipal corporations and none against the State. This case later is
cited as setting the whole matter at rest that the right to
compensation against municipal corporations is a matter of
legislative grant. The case nowhere suggests that the pre-
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vious cases in which the right to compensation was said
to be a constitutional one were either incorrect or were
decided solely on statutes. It does decide that the Constitution is inapplicable since there was no injury by a
municipal corporation invested with the privilege of taking
property for public use but was an injury by the State, and
that in such a case the right to compensation is a matter
of grace and grace alone.
In Burdsall v. Lansdowne Boro.4 ° it was said, "Municipal
corporations are liable to be called upon to make compensation for injury to property resulting from interference with
or change of the natural flow of waters as a consequence of
their public works" (here change of grade of a street).
Allison v. Bigelow, S. H. Comm. 4

1

involved a change of

grade of a state highway by the Highway Commission in
which some land was actually taken. This brought the
case within the Act of May 31, 1911, P. L. 468 giving compensation for consequential injuries where land was actually
taken.
In State Highway Route No. 7242 the liability of the Commonwealth for damages occasioned by the change of grade
of a state highway was considered. The court refused
recovery stating that the rule was well settled that there
was no constitutional right to compensation against the
State either for land taken or injured in the construction or
improvement of public roads. It was correctly decided that
Article XVI, section 8 had no application to the Commonwealth engaged in the improvement of public highways.
Article I, section 10 was held to be inapplicable to the
State in taking or injuring lands in road construction, referring again to the six per cent allowance as the reason
therefore. Hence the only right had to be found in the
statutes and none had been given where the horizontal lines
of the road had not been changed.
In Herrington'sPetition3 the situation involved a change

4068 Pa. Super. Ct. 215 (1917).
4168 Pa. Super. Ct. 219 (1917).

'6265 Pa. 369 (1919); s. c. 71 Pa. Super. Ct. 85 (1919).
49266 Pa. 88 (1920).
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of grade in the roads of a township of the first class. The
court held that while the preliminary procedure for a change
of grade was before the township commissioners, the Court
of Quarter Sessions had a revisory control upon exceptions
under the Act of June 7, 1901, P. L. 510, section 1, which
eliminated the township as an agency having the power to
exercise eminent domain, and substituted therefor the judiciary. It was said, "Although townships of the first class
may be said to have a qualified power of eminent domain,
they do not have the exclusive power to take land for highways, and such right as they do possess is not coequal
with the power as it is enjoyed by municipalities recognized
by the constitutional provision. * * * * The term 'munici-

pality' as used in the Constitution does not include all government agencies having authority to take or injure private
property for use as a public highway but such only as are
municipalities with local and subordinate powers of selfgovernment through their own legislation, and to which the
features of police power appertain as an incident of government. It does not include quasi-corporations such as a
township. When the latter is given authority, or a qualified authority, to take land for a highway, the enabling act
must provide for -compensation, with a remedy to recover
it". The case is an explicit admission that there is a constitutional right to compensation for consequential injuries
in road cases against some municipal corporations but holds
that a township of the first class is not such a municipal
corporation.
Donnelly v. P. S. C.4

decides that the vacation of a

street does no injury in the constitutional sense and hence
recovery for such must be based on a statute. It is a reaffirmation of Howell v. Morrisville5 except that the statutes
permitted recovery."6
Wagner v. Bucks County1 holds that there is no con0

44268 Pa. 345 (1920).
'5212 Pa. 349 (1905).
40Hedrick v. Harrisburg, 278 Pa. 274 (1923) also decides that
statutes permitted recovery for the vacation of a street.
'82 Pa. Super. Ct. 448 (1924).
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stitutional right to compensation for injury due to change
of grade in a state highway when caused by the state authorities.
Ernaus Boro. v. S. Trust Co.48 decides that the Constitution gives a right to damages wh-ere land is taken by a
borough for opening or widening a street.
Ligionier Boro. v. Deeds49 holds that there is no liability
on the borough for property taken, injured or destroyed in
the paving of a borough street, part of a state highway,
where the improvement was made by the state authorities.
Lenhart v. Wright"0 deals with the acts of the State in
reconstructing a state highway and holds that compensation in such a case is a matter of statutory grant merely.
Falkner v. Winfield Twp. 51 dealt with changes in a road
made by the State Highway Department, the road being in
a township of the second class. It decided that there was
no liability on the township for consequential injuries.
In Fetherolf's Petition 2 a remedy against the borough is
suggested where land was taken by the State Highway
Department with the consent of the borough, for the change
of a borough street, authority to do such being lacking in
the Highway Department. There the usual situation would
be reversed, the state authorities being merely the agents
of the borough in making the change, there being no independent right in the Department to make the change.
In Blainesburg-West Brownsville Road5" the borough
and county had entered into an agreement for the rebuilding of a borough street. A change of grade was made
injuring the plaintiff's property. It was held that there was
no right to recover against the county as no statute imposed
such liability and the county had no power of eminent
domain to change the grade of a borough street. The borough was improperly brought into the proceedings and
D. & C. 395 (1924).
497 D. & C. 598 (1925).
50286 Pa. 351 (1926).
5112 D. & C. 23 (1928).
5284 Pa. Super. CC. 514 (1925).
53293 Pa. 173 (1928).
486
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hence its liability was not adjudicated. The erroneous and
unfounded statement appears in the case, "Damages for
change of grade are consequential injuries and they cannot
be recovered against a municipality unless the right to do
so is given by statute". If the statement be limited to the
facts involved, it is correct, i. e., no remedy can be had,
unless given by statute, against a county in rebuilding a
borough street by agreement with the borough, since the
county in such a case is not a "municipal corporation invested with the privilege of taking private property for
public use". As against the borough in such a case, no
statute would be necessary for recovery as shown by the
cases heretofore discussed.
One of the most important of recent cases is Hoffer v.
Reading Co.54 This case concerned the elimination of a
grade crossing over a railroad by order of the Public Service Commission. Upon application of the State Highway
Commission a grade crossing over the tracks of the Reading Co. was ordered abolished. This was done by constructing a passage under the railroad. In approaching the underground passage, the road officials reduced the grade of the
highway, not, however, altering the existing center or side
lines. There was a gradual lowering to eight feet along
the property of the plaintiff making entrance into his property difficult except at the upper end. The plaintiff was
allowed compensation and the P. S. C. ordered the railroad
to pay all consequential damages occasioned by the change.
The actual grading and building of the road was done by
the State Highway Department.
The court said, in part, "It is clear that the change of
grade of a public road does not furnish the basis for the
recovery of damages against a municipal corporation by an
abutting owner, whose property was 'injured' by the elevation or depression of its bed unless liability for the loss sustained is expressly fixed by some act of assembly". It has
been shown by the cases discussed above that the principle
here enunciated is too broad entirely and unless limited to
54287 Pa. 120 (1926).
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particular municipal corporations and particular cases
against municipal corporations is incorrect and unjustified
by the language of the Constitution, the history of litigation before the adoption of the Constitution and the cases
decided under the Constitution. All the cases cited by the
court have been discussed by us except Spang & Co. v.
Comm. 5 The Supreme Court cites this case as holding
that where damage results from change of grade, no recovery can be had against the Commonwealth unless imposed by statue. That case holds, however, that no injury
was shown and hence cannot be authority for what the
rule might have been had there been an injury.
Applying and limiting the general rule set out in the
Hoffer case to the facts of that case, the rule is correct.
The injury was caused in a proceeding instituted by and
actually carried out by the State Highway Department. In
such a case there is no constitutional right to compensation
although the injury be one that if done by a borough or
city would create a constitutional right to compensation.
The court also decided, and such was justified by the
previous decisions, that the railroad was not liable under
the Constitution for consequential injury resulting from the
lifting or lowering of its tracks on the right-of-way which
it had acquired, although the alteration of a roadway crossing was involved, where it did not take land or alter lines
beyond this right-of-way."
The defendant railroad insisted that, there being no
constitutional right to damages as against it, damages could
only be assessed against it by virtue of statutory imposition.
It argued that the P. S. C. Act of July 26, 1913, P. L. 1374,
Article V, section 12 as amended by July 17, 1917, P. L.
102557 gave the P. S. C. no power to assess a public service
55281 Pa. 414 (1924).

"Limits of space forbid the discussion of the railroad cases under
Article XVI, section 8. But see Ogontz Avenue, 225 Pa. 126 (1909)
where the distinction betwveen the railroad cases and the municipal
corporation cases is suggested to be without substantial basis.
57
It reads, "The Commission shall also have power ....to order any
crossing . . . . at grade . . . . to be . . . . abolished, according to
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corporation for consequential injuries, arising from a
change of grade beyond the lines of its own property, occasioned by the alteration of a highway, so that it might
pass through a subway. The Supreme Court sustained this
argument holding that the Act imposed no such liability.
The court held that the Act was authority to assess damages allowed by the Constitution or legislative enactments
and did not create new liability. It was said that the Act
contemplated existing rights to compensation under some
statute and merely determined how this should be apportioned, no new liability being imposed for change of grade.
Recovery was denied.
The case seems to be correctly decided as far as the
constitutional question is concerned. The proceeding having been initiated and the change made by the State Highway Department, there was no constitutional right to compensation for consequential injuries suffered. Again the
fact that other corporations are made the paymasters
should not change the essential nature of the rights under
the Constitution.
The latest important case on the grade elimination
question is Westmoreland C. & C. Co. v. P. S. C."5 An
avenue in the city of New Castle crossed the river over a
county bridge. The street crossed the tracks of several
railroads at grade on either side of the river. The bridge
was destroyed by a flood and the County petitioned the.
P. S. C. for an order abolishing the grade crossings. The
Commission made the State, County, City and railroad and
railway companies parties to the proceeding. The Commisplans

....

and reasonable terms and conditions to be prescribed,

by the Commission ....
The compensation for damages which the
owners of adjacent property, taken, injured or destroyed, may sustain ....
shall be ....
paid ....
by the public service companies
or municipal corporations concerned .... The Commission shall have
the right to recover for ....
the Commonwealth ....
as debts ....
from the public service ....
companies, or municipal corporations,
in such amounts or proportions against each as may be determined
by the Commission ..... the amount of the damages or compensation
awarded to the owners of adjacent property by the Commission".
58294 Pa. 451 (1928); 144 Atl. 407.
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sion ordered the crossings abolished and substituted therefor a bridge above grade. The bridge in spanning the river
and railroads was of such an elevation that when the city
street was reached, it was necessary to build approaches
or abutments to meet it. A solid concrete wall occupied
most of the street and extended along the lands of the
plaintiff company. At one end of its property the wall was
63/2 feet high and at the other 17 feet high. An award of
damages was made to the plaintiff, no part of whose property was taken and whose claim was for consequential
damages only. The railroad company appealed the award
alleging non-liability for such consequential damages and
relied on the Hoffer case.
As far as the consequential injuries suffered are concerned, the case is indistinguishable from the Hoffer case.
There the injury was beyond the right-of-way of the railroad. It was in the present case. There the injury was
injury to access by lowering the grade. In the instant
case the injury was to access by raising the grade. Here,
however, the work in no way involved the State Highway
Department but only the municipal and public service corporations."9
In its discussion the court speaks of Chester County v.
Brower, 117 Pa. 647, and Delaware County's Appeal, 119 Pa.
159. It says of these cases, "We there stated that a county
-was a municipality within Article XVI, liable for consequential injuries to property injured by change of grade,
though the State had not provided a remedy. These cases
were in opposition to repeated expressions of the court
as to the effect of similar constitutional provisions. Since
then, these decisions have been modified, if not set aside.
We have returned to our former policy of placing the right
to damages within the grant of the sovereign, and the rule
is now well settled that damages for consequential injuries
can not be recovered by a property owner under the present
Constitution, unless the legislature gave that right and im59s. c. 293 Pa. 326 (1928) at p. 329-another appeal, decision being
handed down the same day.
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posed such liability on the municipality; * * * * but unless
the legislature, by statute so provides, the owner is without
remedy. The question was put at rest in Jamison v. Cumberland County, 48 Pa. Superior Ct. 33, affirmed in 234 Pa.
621, where our former decisions were before the court. In
discussing the earlier cases, it was there stated that, when
counties erect bridges pursuant to statutory authority, and,
under such laws property is taken, the constitutional provision requirees them to make compensation for property
taken, injured or destroyed. The effect of that decision was
to reduce Chester County v. Brower, supra, and Delaware
County's Appeal, supra, to the recovery of damages under a
statute".
Most of the above quotation seems unjustifiable. There
never had been, prior to 1874, any "similar constitutional
provisions" in Pennsylvania and the Court points to none.
Hence these two cases could not be "in opposition to repeated expressions of the court as to the effect of similar
constitutional provisions". Article XVI, section 8 cannot
be said to be similar in language or meaning to the amendment of 1838, which is the only provision it remotely resembles. As has been shown by the discussed cases, there
is but dicta of recent origin, to the effect that the right to
compensation for consequential injuries against municipal
corporations is statutory only. It cannot be seen how the
two cases have been modified or set aside. The Jamison
case certainly did not have that effect. It decided merely
that where the acts were those of the State Highway Department, the constitutional provision was inapplicable. The
Chester County case was approved in the Jamison case but
distinguiehed in that the former involved a corporation invested with the privilege of eminent domain which it had
exercised. After the Jamison case, as before, in proper
cases, there is a constitutional right to consequential damages against municipal corporations. It will be noted that
all the statements in the Westmoreland case as to the right
to damages in the absence of statutory grant are dicta
merely. The court found statutes imposing liability and
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hence was not called upon nor was it necessary to decide
the rights of the litigants in the absence of statutes.
The court decided that liability had been imposed by
statutes on the city and the county. Unless the fact that
the P. S. C. ordered the bridge to be built is sufficient to
make the whole proceeding an exercise of the state's sovereign power in building roads and bridges, the right to
compensation as against the city and the county would
have been a constitutional one under Article XVI, section
8. Nothing not dicta in the previous cases would seem to
take them out of the constitutional provision. The case
was treated by the court as a county bridge case. In deciding the constitutional question, it should be treated as an
eminent domain proceeding by the party which instituted
the proceeding and which would have the authority to build
the road or bridge if grade crossing eliminations were not
involved.
Part of the damages for the consequential damages
suffered were assessed against the railroad company. The
holding of the Hoffer case was repeated that it required a
statute to impose suchi liability on the railroad and that
the P. S. C. Act did not impose such liability. In some
mysterious way in the instant case the opposite result to
that reached in the Hoffer case was reached without pointing out a statute imposing the liability. It can be only the
P. S. C. Act as no other possible one is mentioned. Although
citing the Hoffer case with apparent approval, it must be
reversed impliedly by the imposition of liability. As said
before, the cases seem indistinguishable as far as injury and
liability of the railroad are concerned. Since the opposite
result is reached, however, the conclusion seems irresistable
that the Hoffer case is not now the law.
Before concluding we wish to call attention to the
recent case of Penn Builders, Inc. v. Blair County.60 In this
case there was brought before the Supreme Court for the
first time, the recent practice of the State Highway Department of plotting roads of greater width than is oc60302 Pa. 300 (1931), opinion by the late Justice

Sadler.
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cupied presently. The purpose is to prevent use of this
additional strip for building purposes and thus reduce the
amount of damages that will be due when the width is
actually occupied. In the instant case the official plotting
was of one hundred feet but thirty-three feet only was
occupied. The plaintiff claimed compensation for one hundred feet. The constitutional question was peremptorily
dismissed by saying, "Without statutory provision, no claim
could have been made by the landowner for the loss sustained * * * *".

The taking being by the State, this con-

clusion is consistent with the previous cases heretofore discussed by us. Article XVI, section 8 clearly is inapplicable.
The court reiterated the well established rule in Pennsylvania that for a mere plotting of a road to be built in
the future, no compensation need be paid until actual occupancy. It was held, however, that this rule was inapplicable since entry on part of the plotted width was sufficient to make payment necessary for the whole width. But
since the award of damages had not been confirmed, the
court kindly suggested that it was not too late to alter the
certified plan. It was suggested that the plan be changed
of record to include but 33 feet, the amount actually occupied. Thereafter, without present liability, plots might be
certified to cover the additional strips on each side. Thus
100 feet would be plotted while present payment would be
confined to 33 feet. The effect of such plotting would be
to prevent future compensation for buildings erected within
the plotted width. Since the actual present taking of all
would not constitutionally require payment by the State,
this less arbitrary method must also be constitutional.
We conclude that the decided cases in Pennsylvania
applying Article XVI, section 8 in road opening, widening
or grade changing cases, ignoring any unsupported dicta,
establish: (1) That there is no constitutional right to damages for consequential injuries where the State is responsible for the injuries inflicted; (2) That there is such a constitutional right where the injury is caused by a municipal
corporation with local and subordinate powers of self-
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government through their own legislation, and to which the
features of police power appertain as an incident of government, acting under its own legislative power. 61 We appreciate the fact that this discussion is incomplete, leaving
many questions untouched. Lack of space prevents such
further discussion at this time.
Carlisle, Penn'a.

HAROLD S. IRWIN

61Adopting the qualification in the well considered case of Herrington's Petition, 266 Pa. 88 (1920)-which the recent dicta fail to
notice, even though a very recent case.

